Public enterprise reforms and financial performance of government commercial companies of Fiji by Narayan, Jashwini J. & Singh, Gurmeet
This article was downloaded by: [University of the South Pacific], [Gurmeet Singh]
On: 18 August 2014, At: 17:22
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
International Journal of Public Administration
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/lpad20
Public Enterprise Reforms and Financial Performance
of Government Commercial Companies of Fiji
Jashwini Narayana & Gurmeet Singha
a School of Management and Public Administration, The University of the South Pacific,
Suva, Fiji
Published online: 14 Aug 2014.
To cite this article: Jashwini Narayan & Gurmeet Singh (2014) Public Enterprise Reforms and Financial Performance
of Government Commercial Companies of Fiji, International Journal of Public Administration, 37:11, 756-772, DOI:
10.1080/01900692.2014.903275
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.903275
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
International Journal of Public Administration, 37: 756–772, 2014
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0190-0692 print / 1532-4265 online
DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2014.903275
Public Enterprise Reforms and Financial Performance of Government
Commercial Companies of Fiji
Jashwini Narayan and Gurmeet Singh
School of Management and Public Administration, The University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji
Public enterprise reform is no new phenomenon. Since the late 1970s, state intervention in
the market has been increasingly challenged, acquiring a more ideological form with the rise
of ultra-conservative governments in the UK and USA. Like other countries across the world,
Fiji has also attempted to reform its public enterprises. This article compares the performance
of corporatized public enterprises that sit at different levels of financial performance. Such
enterprises have experienced reforms but with mixed financial outcomes. Overall, the major
finding of this research is that there is no single factor that can lead to better or poor financial
performance.
Keywords: public enterprise reforms, government commercial companies, financial perfor-
mance, Fiji
INTRODUCTION
Public enterprise reform (PER) is no new phenomenon. It has
been in existence for some time now. PER programs first
began in the UK in the late 1970s. Since then, state inter-
vention in the market has been increasingly challenged.
Such a challenge acquired a more ideological form with
the rise of the ultra-conservative governments in the UK
and USA. Not limited to the developed world, PER has
become the hallmark of public policy making throughout
the world, including the developing as well as the under-
developed nations (Narayan, 2005). Public enterprises are
normally criticized because they are often subsidized by
their governments, operate in losses ultimately borne by
their governments (and tax payers), provide inferior goods
and services, restrict choice of consumers, and remain static
(Yaqub, Faisal, & Khan, 2011). Accordingly, the proponents
of reforms recommend that public enterprises be placed on
a full commercial footing independent of political directives,
be fully compensated for community service obligations, and
be exposed to competition with strict budget constraints and
full accountability (Anere, 2009). However, over the years,
Correspondence should be addressed to Gurmeet Singh, School of
Management and Public Administration, The University of the South
Pacific, Private Mail Bag, Laucala Campus, Suva, Fiji. E-mail: singh_g@
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PER has attracted both commendation as well as condemna-
tion. Whereas efficiency, effectiveness, and efficacy became
the catchphrases justifying reforms, over the years consid-
erable debate emerged between the reform critics and the
advocates over reform issues and effects. Individual coun-
tries have their own unique problems to deal with which
affect reform results.
As countries began to implement reforms, a large part
of such debate was fueled by the outcomes of reforms
and, in many cases, by the evidence of failed experiments
(Narayan, 2005). For instance, Sarker (2006) highlights that
Bangladesh has been less successful when it implemented
reforms under pressure particularly because it failed to estab-
lish sound institutional frameworks, rule of law, proper
control structures, checks and balances, and accountability.
He mentions that Bangladesh is also aid-dependent and thus
has always felt the pressure from the international donors
toward reforming its public sector. He also blames the donor
agencies for failing “to make the political leadership and the
public bureaucracy understand that their prescriptions will
bring positive results” (p. 195). Malaysia is another exam-
ple. According to Siddiquee (2008), public governance is
better than what it was but Malaysia still has much to do
to achieve excellence in governance and service delivery.
Despite wide-ranging changes, the Malaysian public sector
remains large. Citizens continuously rely on it for much of
their service needs.
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Elsewhere political opposition has led to reform fail-
ures. Ghana’s experience proved just this (Caspary, 2008).
Caspary (2008) thus recommends that countries and agencies
understand how the key stakeholders view reform propos-
als and the related incentives to minimize opposition and
to maximize support. The politically volatile countries also
find it hard to reform their public sector successfully. The
case of Tajikistan reflects at the failure in the successful
implementation of reform initiatives because of civil war,
country’s location in a politically volatile region, notice-
able out-migration of qualified experts, and the inability of
the central government in properly adapting to transition
requirements (Mirzoev et al., 2007).
In other smaller less developed countries, their own
developmental problems make reform initiatives such as pri-
vate sector involvement difficult. For instance, the small
Eastern-Caribbean countries, namely Antigua and Barbuda,
Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, and
the Grenadines, suffer from their own “developmental” prob-
lems of: small population, small land areas, a long history of
dependence on export of one or a few agricultural commodi-
ties, poor living standards, and inadequate socioeconomic
infrastructure (Bissessar, 2010, p. 26).
Then there are countries which are successful in some
areas but remain problematic in other areas such as
Mauritius. Chittoo, Ramphul, and Nowbutsing (2009) reveal
that while Mauritius has done comparatively well, certain
areas remain problematic such as the government remains
the single largest employer, upper class is too small and mid-
dle class is largely employed by the government and are loyal
to it, and the government is not that appreciative of criticisms
because of which the media is selective in putting pressure on
the government for changes.
Also, there are countries which have had success in PER
but such successes could not be sustained overtime. For
instance, in New Zealand the 14 public enterprises corpora-
tized in 1987 proved to be successful in terms of productivity
and profitability (ADB, 2011). However in the last 9 years,
with an improved economy and significant successive fis-
cal surpluses, the reform process has slowed down because
the fiscal necessity for PER as well as the political commit-
ment has waned, leading to deteriorating public enterprise
performance (ADB, 2011).
Where reforms have not led to desired outcomes,
researchers have been less enthusiastic and even critical of
PER initiatives. Radical critics of reforms thus argue that
reforms have not resulted in what was promised. Reforms
have either led to no improvement at all or have proved to
be socially costly. Some radical opponents of reforms like
Marobela (2008) raise their doubts on reforms resulting in
efficiency and the overall good for all. He highlights that
in Botswana’s case, while reforms are preached as result-
ing in efficiency, “in practice such has not been the case”
(p. 431). Quiggin (2001) mentions that the market processes
such as compulsory competitive tendering have eroded state
capacity and generally produced unsatisfactory outcomes.
Public enterprises that have gone through the final stage of
PER (those that have been privatized) have been labeled
socially insensitive. Vagliasindi (2008) explains that in the
absence of regulation, a private monopoly may end up pro-
viding a higher priced, poor quality goods or services. Chang
(2007) mentions that if services such as post, water, and
transport are left at the mercy of profit-seeking private firms,
the remote area consumers may be denied essential ser-
vices because private firms will not venture into unprofitable
services.
Hence, by the 1990s, there came about a renewed appreci-
ation for the public sector given the following factors: experi-
ence of the “Asian Tigers” which proved that the state could
be quite effective toward economic development; the cumu-
lative 20-year experience of structural adjustments which
revealed a serious shortfall in the expected socioeconomic
results; the collapse of the Soviet economies; and the failure
of privatization in creating effective markets (Brinkerhoff,
2008).
Those in favor of the state created enterprises defend the
state. For example, Kumar (2010) argues that, while the key
arguments of inefficiency, corruption, and liability of public
enterprises are true to some extent, such ills also plague the
private sector. There are also arguments against reforming
public enterprises completely through privatization as well
as strong sentiments of retaining certain public enterprises
under state control. Hughes (2012) clarifies that privatiza-
tion has been successful at least in the narrow sense of less
government-owned enterprises in current times. He men-
tions that consumers are unlikely to reap major benefits if
privatization fails to bring about greater competition and
that many countries have some sort of competition policy
or antitrust legislation to enforce private sector competition
to restrain possible collusion and monopoly among private
companies.
At the other end, the supporters of PER criticize state cap-
italism. For example, Schuman (2011) highlights the case
of Russia which he says is a state capitalist and one that
is strangling its economy. In his most recent book, Hughes
(2012) claims that public enterprises may not have a long-
term future in large scale delivery of goods and services. He
goes onto say that, it is likely that such enterprises will even-
tually disappear except for small scale activities. The debate
thus continues between the proponents and opponents on the
success and failure of PER.
Overall, literature on PER points out that, encouraged
and financed by the donor agencies, the developing coun-
tries have undertaken reforms of their public enterprises to
improve their performance. As indicated above, literature
also provides clear evidence that reforms have not corrected
the ills of all public enterprises the world across, giving
rise to the question: why is it that reforms fare well in
certain public enterprises while others remain plagued. This
research has been undertaken against this backdrop.
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This research is exemplified by a country case study
of Fiji. Fiji, an island nation located in the heart of the
Pacific Ocean, is a developing country. It is endowed with
forest, mineral, and fish resources with a large subsis-
tence sector. Its major sources of foreign exchange are
sugar exports, remittances from Fijians working abroad,
and a growing tourist industry. However, Fiji has a coup-
ridden economy. It currently operates under the military rule
of the self-appointed Prime Minister, Commodore Josaia
Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama, since the 2006 coup. Apart
from the 2006 coup, Fiji has experienced earlier military
coups in 1987 and 2000. Nevertheless, like other countries
across the world, Fiji has also tried to reform its public
enterprises.
Governments of Fiji, except the Fiji Labour Party-led
Government (May 1999–May 2000), have been pro-reform.
The PER process in Fiji was initiated by the Rabuka-led
Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) Government after
the 1987 coups. The process of reforms commenced mid-
1980s but was delayed due to the uncertainty created in the
economy following the two 1987 military coups. Since then,
Fiji experienced economic recession and structural adjust-
ment policies. Fiji has carried out reforms of its public
enterprises for some time now.
Drawing from the existing literature on the success and
failure of reforms throughout the world, this research will
show how reforms have led to better financial performance
in some public enterprises while others remain the same
or have worsened—a fact that remains under-researched in
Fiji. Thus far, quite a few studies have been carried out
on PER in Fiji. Few comparative studies and even fewer
multiple PER related cases have been investigated. Thus
far, past research reveals that the following public enter-
prises have been investigated: Airports Fiji Limited (AFL;
McMaster, 2001; Singh, 2002; Snell, 2000), Customs and
Excise Department (Chand, 1999), Fiji Pine Limited (Reddy,
1997, 1998), Fiji Post and Telecommunications Limited
(Reddy, 1997, 1998), Fiji Sugar Corporation (Kumari, 2007;
Lal & Rita, 2005; Reddy, 2003; Reddy & Kumari, 2007),
Government Shipyard and Public Slipways (McMaster,
2001; Narayan, 2005, 2008), Housing Authority (Nath,
2000; Sharma & Hoque, 2002), Inland Revenue Department
(Chand, 1999), National Bank of Fiji (Chandra, Jayaraman,
& Waqabaka, 2004; Lodhia & Burritt, 2004; Reddy, 1998),
Ports Authority of Fiji (PAF; Singh, 2002), and Public Rental
Board.
Most of these studies have focused on reform implemen-
tation and its aftermath in public enterprises except for the
research by Chand (1999—on Inland Revenue Department
and Customs and Excise Department) and Nath (2000—
on Housing Authority). These two authors have focused
on performance management systems (PMS) in the pub-
lic sector. Most studies have been broad based and have
reviewed reforms on Fiji as a whole such as the work of
Appana (2003). As Sharma and Lawrence (2002) claim,
little attention has been paid to empirically support or con-
demn rationales for public sector reform in a particular
setting, especially in a developing country context such as
that of Fiji. As per Ferlie, Hartley, and Martin (2003), past
research have particularly been UK-centric. This research is
an attempt to fill these gaps as well as to answer calls for
future multi-site studies, as suggested by Sharma and Hoque
(2002).
In this article, public enterprises that sit at different
levels of financial performance are examined. The Fiji
Government, in its quest to improve the financial per-
formance of government commercial companies (GCCs),
instituted structural changes of commercialization and cor-
poratization. This study provides evidence that such reform
efforts have not resulted in better financial performance
across all GCCs.
The GCCs have experienced reforms but their financial
outcomes have been mixed. With seven GCC case stud-
ies, this research is more extensive than past studies and
can thus lead to more concrete generalizations. In addition,
given the reform related transformations currently underway
in Fiji’s public enterprises, studies such as these are not
only timely but can also have policy/managerial implica-
tions. This is particularly important since, while progress on
restructuring of public enterprises has been limited in recent
years, Fiji is preparing several of these enterprises for greater
private sector involvement and is also looking into corpora-
tization of some government functions (ADB, 2011). This
article can hence, provide practitioners—public managers,
policy makers, as well as the donors with insights on what
affects financial performance of public enterprises and areas
that need improvement. In this regard, this article lists some
recommendations in concluding remarks.
The performance of GCCs as assessed by the Fiji
Government and the ADB particularly centers on economic
and/or financial indicators without elaborate explanations on
what causes differences in financial performance between
individual public enterprises. This leaves the following ques-
tion unanswered—why is it that some public enterprises fare
well while others continue to underperform. To answer this
very question, this study describes the over-time develop-
ments in the GCCs to identify the possible causal factors that
can explain the difference in financial performance. To the
best of the researcher’s knowledge, this research is the first
scholarly larger-scale, multiple-case study research on PERs
in Fiji.
This research compares the financial performance of
Fiji’s corporatized public enterprises—the GCCs. A GCC
is a wholly government-owned corporatized enterprise. It is
generally financed through government equity and/or debt.
The seven GCCs selected for this research are (1) AFL,
(2) Post Fiji Limited (PFL), (3) Fiji Ports Corporation
Limited (FPCL), (4) Unit Trust of Fiji (Management)
Limited (UTOF), (5) Food Processors (Fiji) Limited (FPFL),
(6) Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited (FHCL), and
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(7) Rewa Rice Limited (RRL). Using profits generated
by individual GCCs and dividends paid by each GCC,
these GCCs were separated into better and poor financial
performers.
The earlier four (1, 2, 3, and 4) are better performers in
that they are able to generate profits and pay dividends to the
government. However, they have experienced fluctuations
and/or declines in revenue, profits, and dividends over the
years, which is why they are not labeled the best or excellent
performers. Even then, these four are comparatively better in
financial performance when compared to the latter three poor
performers. The latter three (5, 6, and 7) are riddled with
numerous problems, operate in losses or generate insignifi-
cant profits and have never been able to pay dividends to the
government. The focus of this article is on the causal fac-
tors that can explain better and poor financial performance.
Financial data alone is just hard quantitative data and can-
not capture the reasons behind financial results (Lusthaus,
Adrien, Anderson, Carden, & Montalvan, 2002); the more
the reason to explore the factors that can explain the differ-
ence in the financial performance of GCCs. This article does
acknowledge that an organization can be assessed on other
types of performance. However, it is only interested in the
causes of better and poor financial performance. Discussion
on other types of performance is beyond the scope of this
article.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research used qualitative research methods to col-
lect data which were gathered through in-depth face-to-face
interviews and relevant primary and secondary data. Since
this research is qualitative in nature, it used the nonprobabil-
ity sampling of purposive sampling. “Qualitative researchers
tend to use nonprobability or nonrandom samples” (Neuman,
2006, p. 220). This sampling began with a purpose in mind
with specific predefined groups, the GCC styled public enter-
prises. In addition, this research used a subcategory of
purposive sampling—the snowball sampling. Snowball sam-
pling begins with identifying someone who can be included
in the study and who can recommend the sample that may
not be as readily accessible by the researchers on their
own (Trochim, 2006). “It begins with one or a few peo-
ple or cases and spreads out on the basis of links to the
initial cases” (Neuman, 2006, p. 223). The researcher first
interviewed a key senior official at the Ministry of Public
Enterprises, Tourism and Communications (MPETC) who
recommended names of key contact personnel at the selected
GCCs.
Altogether, 30 in-depth interviews were conducted.
To better understand the actual developments that had
occurred and are occurring at the selected case studies,
there was a need to: (1) go back to the seven selected
GCCs where the reform related changes were conceived
and instituted and (2) talk to individuals such as the senior
managers, human resource managers, finance managers,
long-serving lower-level employees, and where possible staff
associations/unions. The rationale behind the selection of
these interviewees is with respect to the amount of rele-
vant data (given the interviewees positions’ and experiences)
that could be gathered on and around the research question.
Because the CEOs were not long enough in their current jobs
in these GCCs, they directed the interviews to their long-
serving staff that were in a better position to provide the
information sought. This combination of interviewees helped
to extract factual information as perceived by those who are
on the implementing side and those on the receiving end of
the reform process.
A detailed description of the interviewees is withheld
given political reasons and job security concerns. Fiji is
currently under military rule and individuals particularly
government employees are wary of information they release
to any member of the public. During interviews, some inter-
viewees even requested that they not be quoted directly.
Assurance of anonymity encouraged the interviewees to
agree to interviews and to speak more openly, without having
the fear of being questioned later on their responses. For this
reason, any information such as names and job positions that
could have identified the interviewees was withheld. Before
the actual interviews, it was made known to all interviewees
that the purpose of the interview was for academic research
and that their names will not be disclosed. For this reason,
this article does not disclose names of interviewees and of
individuals who were/are somehow involved in the reform
process of the case studies for ethical reasons, to ensure
anonymity and for employment security. This non-disclosure
encouraged some interviewees to give out substantial infor-
mation without having the fear of being questioned later
on their responses. When interviewees know they will not
be identified, they are more willing to reveal all sorts of
information (McNeil & Chapman, 2005).
The GCC annual reports; corporate plans; and union,
GCC and ministerial correspondences, memorandums,
brochures, and magazines that were available were examined
to formulate certain GCC-specific questions for interviews
and to cross-check on interviewee responses. Cabinet deci-
sions, ministerial speeches, legislation, and parliamentary
reports were also sought. The secondary sources used were
journal articles, textbooks, conference proceedings, theses
and dissertations, newspapers, and the internet. Both the pub-
lished as well as the unpublished sources were referred to.
For comparison across cases, the research used analytic
comparison—a logic of comparison developed by a British
philosopher and theorist John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), still
widely used today (Neuman, 2006). Neuman (2006) gives
details as follows. Using this qualitative data analysis, a
researcher uses the method of agreement and method of dif-
ferences to find out the causal factors that affect an outcome
among a small set of cases discussed intensively. In the
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method of agreement, focus is on the common factors across
cases. The method of differences identifies factors that are
similar but differ in few crucial ways. It then pinpoints the set
of cases which are similar in outcome as well as the causal
features, and another set where cases have different outcome
and causal features.
For validity, this research used the criteria for validity
of qualitative research which involves credibility, transfer-
ability, dependability, and confirmability (Guba and Lincoln
quoted in Trochim, 2006). The researcher assured credi-
bility of this research by verifying interviewee responses.
All statements were cross-referenced between interviewees’
responses’ and with documents such as previous research
articles, company and ministry documents, published inter-
views in reputable magazines and newspaper articles.
In terms of transferability, the results of this research were
tested in other settings of public enterprises. Dependability
emphasizes that the researcher account for the changes in the
research context. This article is detailed in its description of
the changes that have taken place in the case studies from the
outset. Confirmability relates to the extent to which results
can be confirmed by others. To enhance confirmability, the
researcher checked and rechecked data obtained from the
interviewees throughout the research.
The following section compares across the seven GCCs.
PERFORMANCE BEFORE AND AFTER
REFORMS
There is a need to compare the performance of the GCCs
before reforms were implemented and after the implemen-
tation to note what effects reforms have brought about in
such GCCs. This research showed that reforms in GCCs
have not brought about improvements in all GCCs. There
are GCCs that remain plagued or have even worsened in
financial performance such as FPFL, FHCL, and RRL.
Even the better performers have faced fluctuations and/or
declines in revenue, profits, and dividends in some years.
AFL, FPCL, and UTOF are the better financial performers.
TABLE 1
Financial Ratios
Asset
utilization
Liabilities/total
assets Cash ratio
Average ROA
FY2002–2009
AFL 27% 28% 1.23 1.20%
PFL 94% 57% 0.43 2.10%
FPCL 26% 44% 1.70 2.00%
UTOF 128% 40% 0.26 3.60%
FPFL 69% 40% 0 1.00%
FHCL 9% 15% 0.20 −1.30%
RRL 29% 365% 1.50 −12.60%
Source: ADB (2011).
While they have seen fluctuations in their financial perfor-
mance, they are currently doing well financially. PFL was a
better financial performer since its inception, except in 2006.
However, in recent years from 2009, PFL’s performance has
been disappointing.
The following section compares across the seven case
study GCCs (see Table 1 and Figure 1).
Asset utilization ratio measures management effective-
ness in using company’s assets in daily operations. The
higher the ratio, the better. FHCL’s asset utilization ratio
is the lowest at 9%. This means it earned just 9 cents for
each dollar of asset held. The asset utilization ratio for FPFL,
AFL, and RRL is also on the lower side at 26%, 27%, and
29%, respectively, while this ratio for FPFL is 69%. This
means FPFL earned 69 cents for each dollar of asset held.
PFL’s and UTOF’s asset utilization ratio is better than the
rest at 94% and 128%. Out of all the GCCs mentioned,
UTOF’s asset utilization ratio is the best at 128%. This
means it earned 1.28 cents for each dollar of asset held.
Liabilities/total assets ratio reflects at the proportion of
a company’s assets financed through debt. The higher the
ratio, the higher the risk. AFL’s liabilities/total assets ratio
indicates that 28% of its assets is financed through debt,
thus its risk is lower. FHCL’s liabilities/total assets ratio is
the lowest at 15%. This is because most of FHCL’s borrow-
ings are sourced from government or government-owned
FIGURE 1 Financial ratios.
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enterprises. UTOF’s and FPFL’s liabilities/total assets ratio
is 40% which means that their assets are 40% funded by
debts and 60% from own sources. FPCL’s liabilities/total
assets ratio is 44%, meaning FPCL’s assets are 44%
funded by debts. PFL’s liabilities/total assets ratio indicates
that 57% of its assets is financed through debt. A lower
liabilities/total assets ratio reflects at a safer company but
such companies miss out on investments and growth by
being too safe. RRL’s situation is very risky with the highest
ratio among the GCCs, at 365%.
The cash ratio is a measure of company liquidity. The cash
ratio of FPFL, FHCL, UTOF, and PFL is at the lower side
below 1. While a cash ratio below 1 is not necessarily bad,
holding large amounts of cash reflects poorly at asset uti-
lization. RRL’s, FPCL’s, and AFL’s cash ratio is above 1.
FPCL’s cash ratio is the highest at 1.70. It may be holding
larger amounts of cash, reflecting poorly on asset utilization.
While holding smaller amounts of cash may reflect at effec-
tive asset utilization, in FHCL’s case its asset utilization is
also poor.
Return on assets (ROA) indicates the efficiency of the
management in using its company’s assets in generating
earnings. The higher the ROA, the better. RRL’s ROA is
the lowest at -12.6%. This means RRL lost 12.6 cents for
each dollar invested in assets. Similarly, FHCL lost 1.3 cents
for each dollar invested in assets while FPFL just earned
1 cent for each dollar it invested in assets. For FPFL, ROA
is zero. AFL earned just 1.2 cents for each dollar it invested
in its assets while PFL earned just 2.1 cents for each dol-
lar invested in assets. FPCL earned 2 cents for each dollar
invested in assets. UTOF’s ROA is 3.6%. This means UTOF
earned 3.6 cents for each dollar invested in assets, which is
the highest among the case study GCCs.
According to Table 2 and Figure 2, the GCCs that con-
tinue to report profits are AFL (except in 2002), FPCL,
UTOF (except in 2009), and PFL (except in 2006 and 2010).
While FPFL is able to generate profits (except in 2001, 2002,
and 2008), its profits are low and fluctuates. The GCCs that
continue to report losses are RRL (except in 2008) and FHCL
(except in 2008 and 2010).
TABLE 2
Net Profit After Tax (,000)
Year AFL PFL FPCL UTOF FPFL FHCL RRL
1999 497 1281 42 148 −3982 na
2000 1989 936 10 84 −2938 na
2001 1851 1109 139 −37 −2972 na
2002 −641 1030 156 −23 −1842 na
2003 548 1054 74 46 −3669 −332
2004 2956 1270 42 60 −2354 −576
2005 2562 914 1604 139 47 −2065 −69
2006 632 −1749 4021 140 41 −6792 −56
2007 711 744 4042 230 112 −25,860 −106
2008 4585 368 1446 300 −96 1171 1
2009 5762 870 9862 −280 64 −3001 −53
2010 8759 −795 5283 115 88 1634 −90
2011 8750 149 40 −164
FPCL was incorporated in mid-2004 and began operations in 2005.
The gray areas indicate that audits are underway. MPETC does not
release unaudited figures.
na—not available at the time of research.
Source: MPETC (2012).
Table 3 and Figure 3 show that revenue earned by AFL
has fluctuated but increased from 2007. For PFL, revenue
increased between 1999 and 2005 then continued to decline.
For FPCL, revenue has fluctuated. UTOF shows increases
in revenue between 1999 and 2007, declines till 2009 but
an improvement in 2010. FPFL reports fluctuations between
1999 and 2003, increases between 2002 and 2006, then
decreases till 2008 and increases thereafter. For FHCL,
there are fluctuations with periods of improvement between
2002 and 2005. RRL has shown declines from 2003 to
2006 then reported an increase in 2007.
Sectoral performance can shed light on how the industry,
within which the GCCs operate, performed in recent years.
Ministry of Finance (2011) highlights the following on
sectoral performance in terms of sectoral contribution
toward gross domestic product (GDP). For FPFL and
RRL, their sectoral performance (agriculture) declined
between 2008 and 2010. For FHCL, its sectoral performance
(forestry) declined in 2009 but improved in 2010. For AFL,
FIGURE 2 Net profit after tax (,000).
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TABLE 3
Revenue (,000)
Year AFL PFL FPCL UTOF FPFL FHCL RRL
1999 25,756 21,719 249 1299 5 na
2000 33,887 22,567 326 909 57 na
2001 34,698 26,691 790 1182 13 na
2002 32,245 30,793 794 1181 361 na
2003 35,945 31,772 944 1355 3371 1623
2004 41,931 37,588 1112 1806 6017 1099
2005 45,467 40,112 Na 1231 2426 14,445 751
2006 40,959 35,744 34,713 1398 2898 14,284 106
2007 39,658 33,219 37,640 1571 2468 13,433 748
2008 43,777 29,123 37,192 1546 2408 19,658 na
2009 45,604 29,055 48,665 1464 2681 15,903 na
2010 54,851 26,174 44,692 1638 4054 25,300 na
2011 60,100 na 4140 na
FPCL was incorporated in mid-2004 and began operations in 2005.
The gray areas indicate that audits are underway. MPETC does not
release unaudited figures.
na—not available at the time of research.
Source: MPETC (2012).
its sectoral performance (air transport) declined in 2009 but
improved in 2010. For FPCL, its sectoral performance
(supporting and auxiliary activities) increased in 2009 but
declined in 2010. For PFL, its sectoral performance (post
and telecommunications) increased in 2009 but declined in
2010. Sectoral performance of all these GCCs has fluctuated
except for RRL and FPFL whose sectoral performance has
declined in terms of GDP.
Table 4 and Figure 4 show that except for RRL, FHCL,
and FPFL, the other GCCs—AFL, PFL, UTOF, and FPCL
have paid some dividends to the government. AFL, FPCL,
PFL, and UTOF are quite regular in their dividend payments.
RRL and FHCL, given their negative profits in most years,
have not been able to pay dividends while FPFL with its
small profits sought waiver on dividend payments.
In terms of their profits after-tax and dividends paid to the
government, the case study GCCs can be grouped into two
categories. The better performing GCCs are those that are
able to generate profits and pay dividends to the government.
However, fluctuations and/or declines in revenue, profits,
and dividends have been evident over the years, which is why
these GCCs are not labeled the best or excellent performers.
Even then, these GCCs are better in financial performance
when compared with the poor performers. AFL, FPCL, and
UTOF remain better financial performers. PFL was a bet-
ter financial performer since its inception, except in 2006.
However, in recent years from 2009, PFL’s performance has
been disappointing. The poor performing GCCs of FPFL,
FHCL, and RRL are riddled with numerous problems. They
FIGURE 3 Revenue (,000).
TABLE 4
Dividends
GCCs 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
AFL $1,281,189 $315,780 $1,000,000 $2,292,707 $3,000,000 $1,000,000
PFL $457,148 na $371,722 $184,126 $434,820 na
RRL
UTOF $65,500 $69,800 $114,827 $118,189 na na
FHCL
FPCL $1,609,352 $2,010,746 $2,021,041 $875,983 $1,758,465 na
FPFL
na—not available at the time of research.
Source: MPETC (2012).
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FIGURE 4 Dividends.
particularly operate in losses or generate insignificant prof-
its and are not in a position to pay any dividends to the
government.
Airports Fiji Limited
Pre-reform performance
AFL was declared a GCC on June 3, 1998. It was estab-
lished as a result of the reorganization of the Civil Aviation
Authority of Fiji (CAAF). As per Snell (2000), CAAF was
generally seen as one of the most profitable public enter-
prise between 1979 and 1999. However, even when CAAF
was operating profitably, there were anomalies such as the
laidback, lax work habits where drinking of “grog” (national
traditional drink made of powdered kava roots mixed in
water) was a key regular event. In addition, there were no
proper controls and no accountability. CAAF was not run
like a business but was able to generate profits because
of its monopoly status. This explains why, its ROA was
just 5% against the expected 10% even when CAAF gen-
erated a profit (after interest and tax) of $5.8 million at that
time.
Post-reform performance
Since 1999 after corporatization, AFL continued to report
profits except for the year 2002 given the higher salary
expenses when redundant workers were brought back into
the company. See Tables 2–4. Its revenue fluctuated until
2006 but has increased since. It has also regularly paid div-
idends to the government except for years 2000, 2002, and
2003. AFL loses some $3.3 million annually because of
its loss-making domestic operations (Loanakadavu, 2003).
In analyzing the ADB (2011) figures, AFL’s asset utilization
ratio and ROA is on the lower side indicating that manage-
ment is not so effective in utilizing assets in daily operations.
See Table 1. However, its liabilities/total assets ratio indi-
cates lower risk. In this respect, it is the second safest GCC
among the seven GCCs. Its cash ratio is slightly above 1.
This may mean that it is holding larger amounts of cash
that in turn affects asset utilization adversely. In the later
years between 2008 and 2010, AFL has improved much
in terms of revenue, profits, and dividends despite market
pressures and difficult global economic conditions because
of its careful planning, financial discipline, and improved
utilization of existing assets. AFL has also been financially
independent. For all its investments, it either ploughs back
its profits and/or seeks funds from commercial banks on its
own accord.
Factors that are conducive to AFL’s better financial per-
formance are: financial independence; qualified and expe-
rienced board members and top management; continuous
focus on renovations, upgrades, and purchase of new equip-
ment and technology; projects undertaken to further enhance
efficiency and effectiveness; ongoing training to up-skill
staff; and the implementation of redundancy schemes to con-
trol workforce size. AFL’s monopoly status is also a key
attribute.
Factors impeding AFL’s financial performance are: polit-
ical interference, ongoing tussle between the board, top
management, and union/employees; hard to change work
culture; loss-making domestic airstrips toward which the
government only contributes by way of capital grants; and
external factors such as global crisis, negative reporting on
Fiji’s political situation by overseas media, and unfavorable
travel advise by Fiji’s major trading partners. Such factors
have adversely affected AFL’s operations.
Fiji Ports Corporation Limited
Pre-reform performance
FPCL was formally known as PAF. According to The Review
(1993a, p. 39), PAF was “a self-financing outfit since 1985.”
PAF was quite profitable since its inception until 1992. After
this period, it started to struggle to make changes to meet its
debt financing requirements following government’s refusal
to increase tariff (The Review, 1993b). Between 1992 and
1994, PAF began reporting losses. Between 1994 and 1997,
it generated moderate operating profits. FPCL was estab-
lished upon dual reforms in the port industry. During the
first phase of reforms, PAF was split into two enterprises,
Maritime and Ports Authority of Fiji (MPAF) and Ports
Terminal Limited (PTL). However, even after this first phase
of reform, there were irregularities that needed addressing
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as the port sector had continued with weak technical and
financial performance even after this initial reform.
Post-reform performance
The second reform saw the amalgamation of PTL and MPAF
into one GCC, FPCL. While 2008 reported an increase in
total foreign vessel calls, cargo carrying vessels, vessel num-
bers, and vessel tonnage, it also saw increases in operating
expenses and exchange losses. Revenue and profits were
highest in 2009 while dividend paid was highest in 2007.
See Tables 2 and 3. In the past 2–3 years, FPCL made
failed attempts for tariff increases. In 2009, however, an
increase of 7.5% was accepted against the request of 15%
increase. Revenue and profits have fluctuated since its incep-
tion. In analyzing the ADB (2011) figures, FPFL’s asset
utilization ratio is 69% but it is the third best among the seven
GCCs in this ratio. ROA is on the lower side indicating that
management is not so effective in utilizing assets in daily
operations but it is again the third best among the GCCs in
ROA. Its liabilities/total assets ratio indicates a lower risk at
44%. Its cash ratio is the highest amongst the seven GCCs
which means it may be holding larger amounts of cash,
affecting its asset utilization. Overall, FPCL has always man-
aged to generate profits and is also financially independent.
It only receives grants from the government for the social
obligations met. A continuous focus on improving internal
performance with strict controls on expenditure has led to
considerable reduction in expenses. From the outset, FPCL
has generated revenue and profits but these have fluctuated.
However, it regularly pays dividends to government.
Factors conducive to FPCL’s better financial performance
are: financial independence since the days of PAF; qualified
and experienced board members and top management; con-
tinuous focus on renovations, upgrades, and purchase of new
equipment and machinery; projects undertaken to further
enhance efficiency and effectiveness; ongoing training to
up-skill staff; involving staff in company sports days and
annual functions which strengthens worker–management
relationship to some extent; including customers as well as
ministries in company functions; implementation of redun-
dancy schemes to control workforce size; and creating and
maintaining relationships with relevant associations such
as the Pacific Countries Ports Association, International
Association of Ports and Harbours, International Cargo
Handling Co-ordination Association, Association of
Australian Ports and Marine Authorities, Fiji Business
Councils, Fiji Employers Federation, and the Cruise Liner
Task Force. PTL’s monopoly status is also a key attribute.
Factors impeding FPCL’s financial performance are: cor-
ruption at the highest level, political interference, ongoing
tussle between the board and top management, global cri-
sis, devaluation of Fiji dollar affecting exchange rates which
in turn increase the overseas loan repayments. This GCC is
able to generate profits and pay dividends to the government.
However, if the mentioned impeding factors are addressed it
will be able to perform even better.
Post Fiji Limited
Pre-reform performance
In its early days, Fiji’s postal operation was a division of
a government department—the Department of Posts and
Telecommunications. Later in January 1990, this depart-
ment was corporatized as Fiji Posts and Telecommunications
Limited (FPTL). While the superior performance of Telecom
was undenied as it was the better performing partner, con-
tributing 92% to overall profits (Chaudhari, 1996), the
independent profit making status of Post Fiji could also
not be ignored. Post Fiji earned $680,000 profit in 1993,
$691,000 in 1994, and $1.37 million in 1995 (Fiji Business,
1996, p. 23). Despite being paid little attention during the
days of FPTL, Post Fiji was able to generate profits annu-
ally. It earned almost $1.2 million in profits before its split
from Telecom in 1996 (The Review, 1997, p. 32).
Post-reform performance
With diversification after the split from Telecom, PFL’s prof-
its jumped to approximately $2 million. Around 1999, PFL
was one of the six profitable postal operations in the world
(Chaudhari, 1999). From its inception, PFL was able to gen-
erate profits until 2009 except in 2006 and 2010. See Tables 2
and 3. Prior to 2006, PFL was able to perform particularly
well given little competition but in the later years, competi-
tion affected its performance. PFL has reported increases in
revenue until 2005 since its inception but has seen declines
since then. In analyzing the ADB (2011) figures, PFL’s asset
utilization ratio and ROA is the second best among the seven
GCCs. However, its liabilities/total assets ratio indicates
higher risk at 57%. It has the second highest liabilities/total
assets ratio among the seven GCCs. PFL’s cash ratio is
below 1. Holding smaller amounts of cash reflects at effec-
tive asset utilization. PFL has continued to report profits
except in years 2006 (given the redundancy payout) and
2010. It has also regularly paid dividends to government
except for the years it generated losses. Overall, the later
years has seen declines in revenue and fluctuations in prof-
its as well as dividends, raising concerns on PFL’s financial
performance. In recent years from 2009, its performance has
been disappointing but it has been financially independent.
It only receives grants for the social obligations met.
Factors conducive to PFL’s better financial performance
are: foresight and a proactive approach in the earlier days
of corporatization, diversification of products and services,
counter queue management, marketing, enhancement of the
corporate look by making changes to the interior as well
as the exterior of post offices, sponsorships, financial inde-
pendence, seeking compensation on social obligations met,
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training and encouraging further education to up-skill staff,
allowing employee teams to engage in competitions and
implementing their suggested recommendations, building
and maintaining external alliances with organizations such
as the Universal Postal Union, and continuous investments
in relevant technology. The final attribute needs to be further
strengthened. The above-mentioned attributes had placed
PFL amongst the better performing GCCs for some time.
At one time, PFL was noted as one of the six successful
postal operations in the world (Chaudhari, 1999).
Factors impeding PFL’s financial performance are: cor-
rupt activities of the former top management and board
chairman, increased competition given the rapidly chang-
ing technological environment, hard to change work culture,
and a powerful board which the top management might find
restrictive. These factors have led to declining profits and
dividends, and the inability to remodel business in line with
the current technological changes. Changes are being made
but lack speed.
Unit Trust of Fiji (Management) Limited
Pre-reform performance
According to a UTOF interviewee, in the earlier years,
UTOF was not doing too well until 2000 which led the gov-
ernment to decide on the closure or privatization of it. He
explains as follows. At that time, UTOF was a small com-
pany. The size of its portfolio, amount of dividends, and the
number of unit holders were considered too low for opera-
tions, deemed unviable for the government. It was then when
the former GM came in and turned UTOF around from a
$15 million portfolio to about $90 million by 2008. With
respect to the government’s earlier surprise announcement
of selling off UTOF, government later decided against it.
The former GM held parliamentary discussions and made
ministerial presentations. He advised the ministers that there
will be a turnaround and requested that the company not be
divested.
Post-reform performance
Unlike AFL, PFL, and FPCL, reforms at UTOF have not
been carried out in defined stages or steps. Instead, reforms
have been implemented as a number of changes over the
years for the better. Such positive changes are in the
areas of staff training, new investments, increased invest-
ments, marketing, nationwide accessibility, and computeri-
zation. UTOF’s total funds grew from an initial government
investment of 500,000 to $72.2 million in 2010 (UTOF,
2011). Over the years, UTOF liquidated and paid up this
financial involvement of government, reducing government’s
investment to an even smaller $50,000. UTOF’s total fund
was highest in 2006 at $94.4 million. Overall, its total man-
aged funds increased between 1987 and 1998, declined in
1999, increased between 2000 and 2006, and then declined
in 2007 (UTOF, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008,
2011). Number of unit holders grew between 1987 and 1991,
declined in 1992, and then increased between 1993 and 2007.
In analyzing the ADB (2011) figures, UTOF’s asset utiliza-
tion ratio and ROA are the best among the seven GCCs.
Its liabilities/total assets ratio also indicates lower risk at
40%. Its cash ratio is below 1 and holding smaller amounts
of cash has a positive effect on asset utilization. UTOF’s
profit was only negative in 2009 and highest in 2008. See
Table 2. Profits have improved in 2010 and 2011. Revenue
has been the highest in 2010. See Table 3. UTOF is also a
financially independent GCC. It is able to generate profits
and pay dividends. Given its small non-unionized qualified
and experienced workforce, culture change is not that big an
issue when compared to AFL, PFL, and FPCL.
Factors conducive to UTOF’s better financial perfor-
mance are: strong leadership; qualified and experienced
top management; meaningful training and up-skilling of
staff; portfolio diversification; consideration of competi-
tion; effective marketing which appeals to target market;
continued growth; effective strategies; strong cost manage-
ment; risk management; computerization; quick and easy
methods of purchase and redemption for customers; and Fiji-
wide investment made possible through Post Office and Fiji
Development Bank (FDB) branches.
While UTOF is a better performer, its Momi Bay project
disaster cannot be ignored. In this project, UTOF, FDB, and
Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) were cheated by the
developer Matapo Limited, a Bridgecorp-related company.
At the end of this fiasco, UTOF faces a $12 million debt,
topped up by interest costs. It is claimed that proper due dili-
gence was not done and that there were early warning signals
of the project going under but these were ignored. However,
UTOF is working toward minimizing the loss incurred from
this project. It is holding talks with FNPF, asking it to take
over its $13.5 million (NZ$10.14 million) interest in this
project. Its liability is lower than the other investors since
UTOF is never the leading partner in any project. The future
will be more telling on whether UTOF was able to minimize
this loss and by how much.
Food Processors (Fiji) Limited
Pre-reform performance
Since 1984, FPFL operated under a joint venture partner-
ship between Burns Philp (South Sea) Company Limited and
National Marketing Authority (NMA) (Keith-Reid, 1984).
FPFL began operations after Burns Philp decided to enter
into food processing. NMA was later renamed National
Trading Corporation (NATCO). By 1986, FPFL was the
biggest canned foods operation in Fiji. However, ever since
the takeover of the defunct assets of Castle Trading Limited,
FPFL was plagued with high costs. In 1992, FPFL was
made a subsidiary of NATCO (Appana, 2003). FPFL sur-
vived as the only subsidiary of NATCO. In July 2003, FPFL
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was declared a GCC when NATCO was liquidated. It was
reformed because its parent company could no longer sustain
itself as its debts increased. Without a change in direction,
NATCO could have taken down all its subsidiaries with it.
Post-reform performance
FPFL’s financial performance has seen much fluctuation in
revenue and profits over the years. See Table 3. Total rev-
enue fluctuated between 1998 and 2003, increased between
2003 and 2006, then decreased in 2007 and 2008 but
increased much between 2009 and 2011. FPFL has also
been focusing a lot more on its major products that con-
tribute to high profits. As for profits, FPFL reported losses
in 2001, 2002, and 2008. See Table 2. Profits fluctuated
between 1998 and 2000, and then turned negative and fluc-
tuated thereafter. Profit was at its highest in 1999 followed
by 2007 and lowest in 2008. In analyzing the ADB (2011)
figures, FPFL’s asset utilization ratio is low but it is third
best among the seven GCCs. Its liabilities/total assets ratio
indicates lower risk at 40%. Its ROA is low but better than
the two other poor performers, FHCL and RRL. FPFL is,
however, able to generate small profits but it is in no posi-
tion to pay dividends to the government. It has requested and
has been granted a waiver on dividend payment for a few
years.
Factors impeding FPFL’s financial performance are:
changing the mindset of all its employees toward commer-
cial operations, financial dependence on the government, no
compensation for social obligations met, raw material depen-
dence on rural farmers, supply shortages, high unmet cus-
tomer demand, farmers dishonoring contracts, the inability to
take to task farmers who ignore contractual agreements, high
cost of produce if sourced from outer islands, the inability to
purchase from whoever can supply, lack of proper equipment
and machinery, old buildings, limited processing space, lack
of effective marketing, lack of skilled and experienced per-
sonnel given financial constraints, and the rising cost of other
raw materials such as cans.
FPFL’s key strength lies in some of its products that are
high in demand. For instance, Pacific Crown Tomato Sauce
is a market leader. The high demand of some of its prod-
ucts in overseas markets also shows much potential in export
earnings but supply related problems makes it difficult to
meet demand. There are little improvements such as small
profits generated in some years but the mentioned persistent
problems overshadow such small “wins.”
Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited
Pre-reform performance
The Ministry of Forests was responsible for the development
and maintenance of the mahogany plantations between the
1960s and 1997 (MPETC, 2012). In the 1980s and 1990s,
government realized that it was not good in commercial
business. It then decided to reform its public enterprises.
Accordingly in 1996, a study was carried out to ascertain
the viability of establishing a hardwood plantation corpo-
ration based on the successful transition of the softwood
plantations into Fiji Pine Limited. The study recommended
corporatization (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2002).
Post-reform performance
In March 1998, FHCL was established as a GCC to admin-
ister the commercialization of the mahogany resource. From
its inception until 2003, FHCL remained dependent on gov-
ernment funding. It has been a disappointing performer as it
has not shown any progress since its inception in 1998 until
2007 (MPETC, 2009). The year 2003 history repeated itself
in 2006. In 2006, FHCL was again technically insolvent.
Returns did not flow in as expected. FHCL has reported fluc-
tuating losses, losses being the highest in 2007. See Table 2.
It only reported profits twice in the years 2008 and 2010.
The year 2008 marked the first year of profits for FHCL.
Credit for these positive changes goes to the Administrator
and the then appointed Sri Lankan Financial Manager. The
two worked closely to identify loopholes and put in place
financial controls. They introduced internal restructure and
identified targets. As on January 31, 2011, debts of FHCL
totaled about $26 million. Out of this, about $16.8 million
is guaranteed by government (Nasiko, 2011). FHCL is also
behind in its repayments to FNPF.
Because FHCL is about 80–90% export based even when
it is yet to fully develop its export market, global crisis also
has a significant adverse impact on it. In analyzing the ADB
(2011) figures, FHCL’s asset utilization ratio is extremely
poor at 9%. It is the lowest among the seven GCCs. Its ROA
also runs negative and is the second lowest among the seven
GCCs.
Its liabilities/total assets ratio is lowest among the seven
GCCs since most of its borrowings are sourced from gov-
ernment or government-owned enterprises. Its cash ratio is
below 1 and is the second lowest among the seven GCCs.
While holding smaller amounts of cash may reflect at effec-
tive asset utilization, in FHCL’s case its asset utilization is
also poor. FHCL is also the most controversial of all GCCs.
Marred with landowner and political interference and the
2000 coup after-effects; FHCL was never entirely left on
its own to function commercially from the outset. It was
never really given a commercial environment to work in.
This explains the departure of a number of CEOs who left out
of frustration because the enterprise does not have sufficient
control over its activities. Every now and then, manage-
ment has had to consult and seek approvals from the key
stakeholder—the landowners and this has never been easy.
So far, the government has not received any dividend from
FHCL. FHCL remains dependent on government funding
and/or guarantees.
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Factors impeding FHCL’s financial performance include:
the tussle between the mahogany landowners and the gov-
ernment and their interferences in FHCL’s operations, the
politicization of the industry with frequent changes in the
government and the resulting changes in policies which have
not helped the enterprise to progress, financial dependence
on the government; resource dependence on landowners;
issues of pests, diseases, and land insecurity; sensitivity to
political and economical situation which gives investors a
negative image of the industry; changing the mindset of
FHCL employees toward commercial operations; and lack
of adequate skills, experience, and resource for value-adding
processes.
Factors conducive to FHCL’s financial performance are:
the lucrative resource of mahogany and the latest proposed
set up which appears hopeful and may address some of the
problems. Under the new set up, the role of FHCL will be
confined to a forest manager—it will only be engaged in
the planting and maintenance of plantations until maturity.
The planting and maintenance functions will be contracted
out to the landowners. The industry will operate under a
new licensing regime whereby the processing and market-
ing aspects of the industry will be handled by new licensers
who would be forestry experts in plantations. A number of
stakeholders, including FHCL have expressed their reluc-
tance toward the new set up, however, the future will be more
telling on the effectiveness of this new direction and policy
change.
Rewa Rice Limited
Pre-reform performance
RRL was established when the Colonial Sugar Refinery
(CSR) Company Limited ceased its operations in Nausori.
In its early days between the 1970s and early 1980s, the
rice industry had people, power, and money to invest into
infrastructure. A RRL Interviewee explains as follows. For
instance in 1975, Fiji’s first retail packing machine was put
in place when RRL installed a new rice processing machin-
ery. Subsequently in 1980, RRL made further progress.
To expand its operations in the northern division (Vanua
Levu), RRL set up a modern rice drying and processing
mill in Dreketi. Through the establishment of the mill, RRL
offered the much needed assistance to farmers of the rice
growing belt. Farmers could use the facilities of RRL and
in return sell their paddy to it to sustain themselves. RRL
continued with a comprehensive expansion and moderniza-
tion program a decade later. This involved the construction
of a new building, the installation of a fully computerized
receiving and weighing machinery with 16 tempering dry-
ers, installation of two new dust extractors, construction of
storage silos with a capacity of handling 4000 tonnes of rice
(RRL Background Notes), installation of conveyor belts, and
the replacement of oil-fired driers (The Review, 2002, p. 27).
Such changes not only created a cleaner and better work
environment but also allowed for speed and efficiency. The
1993 deregulation of the industry brought with it problems
of competition. The end result of deregulation was dismal.
According to the chairperson, “there [was] hardly any local
rice to be milled” (Singh, 1998, p. 26).
Post-reform performance
As the status of RRL changed to that of a GCC, it changed
directions for its survival. In 1997, RRL decided to do what
the bigger companies did. It began offering other products
but to different target markets. RRL has seen more downs
than ups in the past three decades (The Review, 2002). It is
one of the “least productive entities” of the government
(The Review, 2004a, p. 2). The Review (2002, p. 27) reports
that from after the 1980s era, RRL has been plagued with
declining rice production, almost forcing it into stagnation.
The Review (2004b) highlights that from 1999 until 2003,
RRL only reported profits of $2.41 million and $121,399 in
1999 and 2001, respectively. The high profit of 1999 is
attributed to the rice quota system introduced by the then
reigning regime, the People’s Coalition Government. In July
2008, RRL requested government to write off its $6 mil-
lion debt. Because of this $6 million debt, RRL is unable
to secure loans from lending institutions. $4.6 million of
the said amount was converted to a grant with a tax levy
of $500,000 but RRL is in no position to pay this levy.
It has to pay the tax liability of $500,000. To this end, it
has been requested to submit a schedule for payment install-
ments to the Inland Revenue Department. RRL’s revenue
declined between 2003 and 2006 but improved in 2007.
See Tables 2 and 3. Between 2003 and 2010, it continu-
ously reported losses except for the small profit generated
in 2008. In analyzing the ADB (2011) figures, RRL’s asset
utilization ratio, while poor at 29% is the fourth best among
the seven GCCs. Its ROA runs negative and is the lowest
among the seven GCCs. Its liabilities/total assets ratio is the
highest among the seven GCCs, reflecting at high risk. Its
cash ratio is above 1 and is the second highest. The over-
all performance of RRL has seen some improvements in the
areas of liquidity position, asset management, and profitabil-
ity. However, return on shareholders’ funds remains negative
as RRL awaits a restructure to its balance sheet by the
government.
Factors conducive to RRL’s financial performance are:
RRL’s brown rice product which is a healthier and more
nutritious alternative than the tastier, popular, and cheaper
competing product of imported white rice. RRL can tap into
the health conscious market. The support and interest of
the current government and the RRL board is also worth
noting.
Factors impeding RRL’s better financial performance are:
short supplies; farmers ignoring contracts; the inability to
take to task farmers who renege on contracts; past debt and
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the related tax liability; competition from the popular, tastier,
and cheaper substitute of imported white rice; lack of mech-
anization; costly upgrades of infrastructure; poor marketing;
and subsidy included in paddy price but not compensated by
the government. These factors continue to plague the rice
industry.
Overall, this research showed that reforms in GCCs have
not brought about improvements in all GCCs. There are
GCCs that remain plagued or have even worsened in finan-
cial performance such as FPFL, FHCL, and RRL. Even the
better performers have faced fluctuations and/or declines in
revenue, profits, and dividends in some years. AFL, FPCL,
and UTOF are the better financial performers. While they
have seen fluctuations in their financial performance, they are
currently doing well financially. PFL was a better financial
performer since its inception, except in 2006. However,
in recent years from 2009, PFL’s performance has been
disappointing.
Table 5 highlights the factors affecting the financial per-
formance of the GCCs.
Table 5 shows the presence and absence of factors in the
better and poor performers. Some of the factors which are
conducive for better performers are actually impeding fac-
tors for the poor performers. The following are examples of
such factors. While financial independence is a conducive
factor for the better performers, financial dependence is an
impeding factor for the poor performers. The other factors
of the ability to generate profits and the ability to invest into
capital projects, upgrades, or investments into relevant tech-
nology, equipment, and machinery are conducive factors for
TABLE 5
Factors Affecting Financial Performance
Causal factors Present in better performers Present in poor performers
Financial independence Yes No
Ability to generate profits Yes No
Ability to invest into capital projects Yes No
Fulfilled social obligations compensated by the
government
Yes but AFL is not fully
compensated
No
Upgrades or investments into relevant technology,
equipment, and machinery
Yes No
Continuous engagement in projects to further enhance
company performance
Yes Some efforts made but constrained by fund
unavailability
Qualified and experienced board, top management, and
employees
Yes Yes mainly, but FPFL mentioned some budget
constraints in recruiting certain qualified personnel
Ongoing training and further education of employees Yes Yes
Effective approach of leaders in learning from past
mistakes and rectifying problems and workable
future plans
Yes No, evidence of some failed projects and unworkable
future plans
Cooperation from the suppliers or owners of resources Generally NA. AFL was a little
affected at one time but the
issue was resolved
No. This is a major issue
Diversification and/or expansion of operations Yes Not much effort, slow efforts, or failed efforts
Seeking outside professional assistance when needed Yes Some effort
Memberships in relevant associations Yes Not much effort
Conducting feasibility studies Yes Some effort
Pro-active approach toward marketing Yes Not much effort, slow efforts, or failed efforts
Competition Yes apart from AFL (except in air
space management) and FPCL
Yes but FHCL has monopoly over the mahogany
resource
Difficult to inculcate commercial culture Yes Yes
Corruption Yes At FHCL
Strained board–management and management–union
relationships
Yes Yes
Political involvement (support-conducive;
interference-impeding) and changes in government
and in its polices
Yes Yes
Negative reporting overseas about Fiji by its trading
partners and overseas media
Yes Yes
Natural disasters Except UTOF, PFL Yes
Pests and diseases NA Yes
Adverse effects of global recession, deregulation, and
devaluation
Yes Yes
Exchange rates adversely affecting overseas loan
repayments
Yes NA
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the better performers. For the poor performers, their inabil-
ity to generate profits and being constrained in the areas
of investments into capital projects, upgrades, or invest-
ments into relevant technology, equipment, and machinery
are impeding factors. However, not all conducive factors are
absent in poor performers. An example here is ongoing train-
ing and further education of employees—a conducive factor
common across case studies.
The poor performers FPFL, FHCL, and RRL are clearly
dependent on their key resource providers or landowners
such as fresh produce suppliers (FPFL), paddy suppliers
(RRL), and mahogany landowners (FHCL). The better per-
formers such as AFL, PFL, FPCL, and UTOF have no such
dependence and are not constrained in this area. At one
time AFL was a little affected during its restructuring phase
when the landowners on whose land the airports were built,
demanded the return of their land. In May 1999 when the
then cabinet granted 15% equity in AFL to the landowning
unit, the issue was resolved (Singh, 2002).
MAJOR FINDINGS
Overall, there are similar key attributes that have made AFL,
PFL, FPCL, and UTOF better performers. Such attributes
are: qualified and experienced board, top management and
employees; strong focus on ongoing training and further
education; proactive approach of leaders who not only
learn from past mistakes but also try to rectify problems;
financial independence; diversifying and/or expanding oper-
ations; conducting of feasibility studies; seeking outside
professional assistance when needed; memberships in rele-
vant associations; effective marketing (particularly at PFL
and UTOF); upgrading or investing into relevant technol-
ogy, equipment, and machinery; continuously engaging in
projects to further enhance performance; and being compen-
sated for social obligations met (PFL and FPCL). These four
GCCs are amongst the better performers. At one time, PFL
was one of the six profitable postal operations in the world.
FPCL has ports comparable to Australia and New Zealand.
UTOF is said to have shown remarkable growth over the
years with 57% market share. In its earlier days, AFL was
generally seen as one of the most profitable public enterprise
between 1979 and 1999. In addition, AFL’s technological
achievement of being the first in the world to implement the
Global Positioning System (GPS) gave it the cutting edge in
global aviation technology.
However, these better performers are not without
problems. They have had problems of corrupt former
top management/board members (PFL, FPCL), strained
board–management relationships (AFL, FPCL, PFL), and
management–union relationships (AFL, FPCL), political
interferences (all four), hard to change work culture (all
four), adverse effects of global recession (all four), and
risky projects (AFL, UTOF) leading to losses. Such negative
attributes have been overshadowed, to a certain extent by the
positive attributes which have helped these GCCs to continue
to generate revenue and profits.
On the whole, while AFL, FPCL, PFL, and UTOF are
labeled better performers since they are able to generate prof-
its and pay dividends, all of them have their own problematic
issues which have affected their financial performance, lead-
ing to declines or fluctuations in profits and dividends paid
over the years. Addressing the mentioned impeding factors
can make them consistent better performers or help them to
improve even further.
The poor performers of FPFL, FHCL, and RRL remain
riddled with numerous problems. They operate in losses or
generate insignificant profits and are not in a position to
pay dividends to the government. The description of events
over the years at FPFL, FHCL, and RRL reflect at a num-
ber of issues that continue to plague them. These issues are:
heavy dependence on the most powerful stakeholders—the
suppliers or owners of resources from whom cooperation
is continuously sought but without much luck; dependence
on natural resources which are susceptible to natural dis-
asters and pests; financial dependence on the government;
no compensation on fulfilled social objectives (FPFL, RRL);
obsolete machinery, equipment, technology, and buildings
which are in dire need of upgrades; the need for extensive
and creative marketing; and lack of forethought on diver-
sification. These enterprises are also adversely affected by
external factors such as deregulation of the industry (FPFL),
lower import duties on substitutes (RRL), rising prices of
raw materials (FPFL), global crisis and its adverse effect
on the economy, and price sensitive customers who pre-
fer cheaper substitutes (RRL). While they are required to
operate like a private sector firm, they are also required to ful-
fill social obligation objectives which no private sector firm
will venture into. These GCCs are neither relieved off their
social obligations nor adequately compensated. For instance,
RRL includes subsidy in its price for paddy to farmers to
encourage continuous supply but this subsidy is not com-
pensated by the government. The above attributes lead to
little to no improvement in their financial performance, at
times even leading to worsened situations. This feedback
loop continues with bad situations getting worse. However,
little improvements such as small profits have been generated
in some years but the mentioned persistent problems over-
shadow such small “wins.” These three GCCs are not prof-
itable operations and in no position to pay dividends to the
government.
There are also some similarities between the better
and poor performers. These similarities are particularly in
the areas of: emphasis on ongoing training and further
education; political involvement; changes in government and
its polices; strained board–management and management–
union relationships; corruption; difficulty in inculcating
commercial culture; negative reporting overseas about Fiji
by its trading partners and overseas media; and the adverse
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effects of global recession, deregulation, and devaluation.
Out of these factors, the first factor—ongoing training and
further education is a conducive factor. Political involvement
and changes in government policies can be both conducive
and impeding. For instance, political involvement can be
positive if it is political support but it can also be nega-
tive if it is political interference in day-to-day operations
which management can find restrictive. Likewise, changes
in government policies can be conducive if it helps the
public enterprise to proceed with positive changes. It can
become negative if it requires the enterprise to reverse what
was done earlier. Good examples are the reform roll back
instructions by the Labour Government. Such reversals and
frequent changes in policies can be costly for public enter-
prises. The remaining factors of strained board–management
and management–union relationships; corruption; difficulty
in inculcating commercial culture; negative reporting over-
seas about Fiji by its trading partners and overseas media;
and the adverse effects of global recession, deregulation, and
devaluation are impeding factors.
The above causal factors can be grouped into six cate-
gories as shown in Table 6.
While a common argument explaining the better financial
performance can be the monopoly status of GCCs such as
AFL and FPCL, what is also true is that their monopoly sta-
tus did not prevent the drop in profits experienced in certain
years given the global crisis, coups in Fiji, coup related neg-
ative publicity of Fiji overseas, and the devaluation of Fiji
dollar which increased the repayments of loans borrowed
from overseas.
AFL and FPCL are regulated monopolies which can-
not increase tariffs or charges without government approval.
In AFL’s case, its only profit making airport is the interna-
tional airport, the remaining domestic airstrips run in losses.
Under government directive, they have to operate the smaller
domestic airstrips; however, AFL is not adequately compen-
sated for this social obligation. Then there is the case of
FHCL which also holds a monopoly over a very lucrative
resource of mahogany but is the worst financial performer.
Thus, monopoly status should not be seen as the key or only
factor causing differences in financial performance of public
enterprises since it alone does not explain what can give rise
to differences in financial performance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The key finding of this research is that there is no single fac-
tor that can lead to better or poor financial performance of
public enterprises. There are a number of factors which can
either enhance or impede financial performance. Also, while
a combination of factors, which include both the financial
as well as the non-financial factors affect financial perfor-
mance of GCCs, two factors are the most important. These
factors are financial independence and stakeholder relation-
ship since most of the other factors can be connected to these
two. For example with financial independence, an enterprise
will be able to invest in capital projects, upgrade infrastruc-
ture and technology, spend on essential training schemes
and marketing, and recruit and retain the needed qualified
individuals. Stakeholder relationship involves relationship
within the enterprise between board, management, employ-
ees, and union as well as relationship with the government
and suppliers. Most of the impeding factors except for the
beyond control external factors (such as adverse effects of
exchange rates, negative reporting on Fiji overseas, and nat-
ural disasters) can be addressed if the two factors of financial
independence and stakeholder relationship are given priority.
The article makes specific recommendations as follows
based on the findings.
First, monitoring and auditing of the GCCs and their
boards should be increased. Agent opportunism such as cor-
ruption cases at PFL, FPCL, FHCL, and UTOF’s Momi Bay
Marriott resort project disaster cannot be totally prevented.
TABLE 6
Independent Factors that Affect Financial Performance of GCCs
Financial factors Financial independence; ability to generate profits, ability to invest into capital projects, being compensated for
fulfilled social obligations
Technological/infrastructure
improvement
Upgrades or investments into relevant technology, equipment, and machinery; continuous engagement in
projects to further enhance company performance and proper handling of such projects
Qualification/experience/capability Qualified and experienced board, top management, and employees; corruption issues and how these are dealt
with; effective approach of leaders in learning from past mistakes and rectifying problems; and workable
future plans
Relationship between stakeholders Board–management and management–union relationships, cooperation from powerful stakeholders—the
suppliers or owners of resources
Commercial culture Commercial culture inculcation, ongoing training, and further education; diversification and/or expansion of
operations; seeking outside professional assistance when needed; memberships in relevant associations;
conducting feasibility studies and pro-active approach toward marketing
Political involvement Political support, political interference, changes in government and its polices, social obligation compensation
by government, and negative reporting overseas about Fiji by its trading partners and overseas media
External factors Competition, natural disasters, pests, and diseases; and adverse effects of global recession, deregulation,
devaluation, and exchange rates increasing overseas loan repayments
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However, such opportunist activities can be detected through
proper oversight and independent audits. The related policy
should be clear on penalty the accused can suffer from when
proven guilty.
Second, the government should look into compensating
FPFL and RRL for social obligations met, the way it com-
pensates GCCs like PFL and FPCL. In this respect, a report
should be prepared by FPFL and RRL on how much the
compensation should be from the time they have not been
compensated. The report should also include the impact of
non-compensation on profits.
Third, the contract between RRL, FPFL, and their sup-
pliers should be relooked at. Contracts should indicate the
penalty on reneging contracts and farmers should be prop-
erly educated on the same. In its current form, the contract
is just a piece of paper which offers no guarantee on consis-
tent supply of agreed quantity and quality at agreed times.
The weakness in the existing contract allows the farmers the
liberty to ignore contractual agreements with RRL and FPFL
when they are able to sell their produce/rice at better prices
to the markets or supermarkets.
Fourth, corporate culture should be given specific atten-
tion as well as time. Most GCCs complain about the laid-
back work culture despite being exposed to continuous
training programs. The focus on corporate culture change is
required because the previous work culture persists despite
continuous training sessions and further education. While
there have been some improvements in productivity, the
public service culture continues. There is a need for the
employees to realize what their role is in a commercialized
enterprise. Training sessions should also include sessions
that are mindset-oriented rather than just task-oriented to
change the worker from within.
Fifth, enhance the management–union relationship.
GCCs should be involved in the change or reform process
as a partner with the government from the very start of the
reform process. In turn, in each GCC, the employees and
unions should be partnered with from the start. Such an
action by GCCs can demonstrate to the union and employ-
ees, their willingness to work as a team which in turn can
reduce resistance, and increase motivation and receptiveness
to change as well as enhance performance.
Sixth, enhance the board–management relationship.
In some GCCs such as FPCL, the heavy involvement of
the board in day-to-day operations leads to management
feeling restricted, controlled, or even powerless. In such an
instance, it is important for both parties to understand one
another. For example, management needs to understand why
boards are acting so stringently. The boards may be treading
cautiously because they will be held accountable for inef-
fective decisions. In turn, the boards also need to be aware
that creativity, innovation, as well as motivation will suffer
in strained relationships.
Seventh, while it is suggested that government assist the
poor performers, such GCCs should be mindful of their
autonomous enterprise status. They should look into mar-
keting much more seriously. They can engage a creative
and qualified consultant to carry out an assessment of their
operations for marketing suggestions.
For FHCL, a wait and watch approach is needed to
observe and analyze how the new policy will fare for the
mahogany industry. From what has been described earlier,
it appears that the landowners will benefit much compared
to current benefits. However, the future will reveal how
effective or ineffective the change in policy will be.
REFERENCES
Anere, R. (2009, May 5). Making PNG’s state owned enterprising success-
ful. Commentary. Pacific islands report. PNG Post-Courier. Retrieved
from http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2009/May/05-15-cm.htm
Appana, S. (2003). New public management and public enterprise restruc-
turing in Fiji. Fijian Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji, 1(1),
51–73.
Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2011). Finding balance: Benchmarking
the performance of state-owned enterprises work in Fiji, Marshall
Islands, Samoa, Solomons and Tonga. Manila, Philippines: ADB.
Bissessar, A. M. (2010). An institutional review of planning budgeting
and monitoring in the Caribbean: Challenges of transformation. The
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 23(1), 22–37.
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2008, November–December). The state and interna-
tional development management: Shifting tides, changing boundaries,
and future directions. Public Administration Review, 985–1001.
Caspary, G. (2008). Tackling opposition to implementing fiscal reform
in developing countries: The case of the infrastructure and natural
resources sectors. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 3(1),
87–103.
Chand, K. (1999). Performance management in the public sector in Fiji:
Implications of leadership, culture and competency on the performance
of public sector organisations (Unpublished Master of Arts thesis).
Department of Management and Public Administration, The University
of the South Pacific, Suva.
Chandra, A., Jayaraman, T. K., & Waqabaka, F. (2004). Reforms in banking
supervision in Fiji: A review of progress. Pacific Economic Bulletin, 19,
102–114.
Chang, H. (2007). State owned enterprise reform. Policy notes 4. New York,
NY: Department of Economics and Social Affairs, United Nations.
Chaudhari, A. (1996, July). Posting a new challenge. The Review, 131–133.
Chaudhari, A. (1999, December 16). Setting the pace: Post Fiji upgrade
includes internet coffee shop. The Review.
Chittoo, H. B., Ramphul, N., & Nowbutsing, B. (2009). Globalisation and
public sector reforms in a developing country. Culture Mandala: Bulletin
of the Centre for East-West Cultural & Economic Studies, 8(2), 30–51.
Ferlie, E., Hartley, J., & Martin, S. J. (2003). Changing public service organ-
isations: Current perspectives and future prospects. British Journal of
Management, 14(S1), 1–14. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2003.00389.x
Fiji Business. (1996, July). The separation that has given post a new start.
Fiji Business, 23–24.
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). (2002). Hardwood pro-
grammes in Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea by D.
Hammond. Forest Plantations Working Paper 21. Forest Resources
Development Service, Forest Resources Division. Retrieved from
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y7207E/y7207e06.htm
Hughes, O. E. (2012). Public management and administration: An introduc-
tion (4th ed.). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
Keith-Reid, R. (1984, December). Food processing: Putting food in cans.
Island Business, 5.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 th
e S
ou
th 
Pa
cif
ic]
, [
Gu
rm
ee
t S
ing
h]
 at
 17
:22
 18
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
4 
772 NARAYAN AND SINGH
Kumar, K. G. (2010). State owned enterprises: Contribution to socio
economic milieu. Retrieved from www.riab.kerala.gov.in/soekerala-docs/
drkopakumar.pdf
Kumari, D. D. (2007). Examination of the proposed restructuring in
Fiji’s sugar industry (Unpublished Master of Arts thesis). School of
Management & Economics, The University of the South Pacific, Suva.
Lal, P., & Rita, R. (2005). Potential impacts of EU sugar reform on the Fiji
sugar industry. Pacific Economic Bulletin, 20(3), 18–42.
Loanakadavu, S. (2003, December 4). Concerns at airport loss. The
Review, 16.
Lodhia, S., & Burritt, R. (2004). Public sector accountability failure in an
emerging economy: The case of the National Bank of Fiji. International
Journal of Public Sector Management, 17(4), 345–359.
Lusthaus, C., Adrien M., Anderson, G., Carden F., & Montalvan, G. P.
(2002). Organisational assessment: A framework for improving perfor-
mance. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre.
Marobela, M. (2008). New public management and the corporatisation of
the public sector in peripheral capitalist countries. International Journal
of Social Economics, 35(6), 423–434.
McMaster, J. (2001). Public enterprise reform in the Fiji islands:
Planning and implementation and reversals. Asian Journal of Public
Administration, 23(2), 229–246.
McNeil, P., & Chapman, S. (2005). Research methods (3rd ed.). London,
England: Routledge.
Ministry of Finance. (2011). Economic and fiscal update: Supplement to
the 2012 budget address. “Empowered Fijians and a modern econ-
omy.” Retrieved from www.finance.gov.fj/s/government-budget.html?
download=156. . .budget
Ministry of Public Enterprises, Tourism and Communications (MPETC).
(2009). General information brief – Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited.
Ministry of Public Enterprises, Tourism and Communications (MPETC).
(2012). Financial data and updated profiles of government commercial
companies.
Mirzoev, T. N., Green, A. T., & Newell, J. N. (2007). Progress towards
health reform in Tajikistan. Journal of Health Organisation and
Management, 21(6), 495–505.
Narayan, J. J. (2005). Privatisation of government shipyard and public
slipways—some lessons. Fijian Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji,
3(1), 35–56.
Narayan, J. J. (2008). Public enterprise reforms in Fiji: How ‘Not’
to privatise—The case of government shipyard and public slipways
(Published Master of Arts thesis). London, England: COOPERJAL Ltd.
Nasiko, R. (2011). FHCL to undergo special audit. Fijilive. Retrieved from
http://www.fijilive.com/news/2011/05/11/32939.Fijilive
Nath, N. D. (2000). Performance measurement and evaluation techniques:
The Housing Authority of Fiji—A case study (Unpublished Master of
Arts thesis). Department of Accounting and Financial Management, The
University of the South Pacific, Suva.
Neuman, W. L. (2006). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantita-
tive approaches (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc.
Quiggin, J. (2001). Economic governance and microeconomic reform. Paper
presented at conference on economic governance, Brisbane.
Reddy, N. (1997). The implications of public sector reforms on human
resource management in the South Pacific: The case of Fiji. Paper pre-
sented at the conference on human resources and future generations in
islands and small states, Valletta, University of Malta, 6–8 November.
Reddy, N. (1998). Culture change in corporatised organisations in Fiji.
Paper presented at the Sietar congress on dialogue for creating a global
vision, Tokyo, Reitaku University, 20–24 November.
Reddy, N. (2003). Survival strategies for the Fiji sugar industry. Fijian
Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji, 1(2), 265–285.
Reddy, N., & Kumari, D. (2007). Reform in Fiji’s sugar industry. Paper
presented at the Pan Pacific conference, Dunedin and Queenstown, 1–4
June.
Rewa Rice Limited (RRL). Background notes. Provided by RRL.
Sarker, A. E. (2006). New Public Management in developing countries: An
analysis of success and failure with particular reference to Singapore and
Bangladesh. The International Journal of Public Sector Management,
19(2), 180–203.
Schuman, M. (2011, September 30). State capitalism vs the free mar-
ket: Which performs better? Time Business: Wall Street & Markets.
Retrieved from http://business.time.com/2011/09/30/state-capitalism-vs-
the-free-market-which-performs-better/
Sharma, U., & Hoque, Z. (2002). TQM implementation in a public sector
entity in Fiji: Public sector reform, commercialisation, and institution-
alism. The International Journal of Public Sector Management, 15(5),
340–360. doi:10.1108/09513550210435700
Sharma, U., & Lawrence, S. C. (2002). Commodification of education
and academic labor in a university setting: Using a balanced scorecard
approach in a university setting. Retrieved from http://aux.zicklin.baruch.
cuny.edu/critical/html2/7056sharma.htm
Siddiquee, N. A. (2008). Service delivery operations and governance: The
Malaysian experience. Transforming Government: People, Process and
Policy, 2(3), 194–213.
Singh, A. (2002). Public enterprise restructuring and industrial relations in
Fiji: With case studies of Ports Authority of Fiji and Airports Fiji Limited
(Unpublished Master of Arts thesis). Departments of Development
Studies and Management and Public Administration, The University of
the South Pacific, Suva.
Singh, D. (1998, September). Rewa rice or is it rewa trading? Government
rice company diversifies into wholesaling to survive competition. The
Review, 26.
Snell, D. (2000). Fiji’s civil aviation: New Zealand style restructuring using
New Zealand replacement workers. New Zealand Journal of Industrial
Relations, 25(2), 109–118.
The Review. (1993a, April). Streamlining for a leaner profile: PAF does
an about-turn of policies and plans to launch simple tariffs to pass on
benefits. The Review, 39–40.
The Review. (1993b, October 30). The mess at the ports. The Review.
The Review. (1997, September). This ain’t no dinosaur: Peni Mau wants
Post Fiji to be a role model for the South Pacific. The Review,
32–33.
The Review. (2002, July). Rewa rice: Revitalising production. Dr Ali charts
a new path for the struggling company. The Review, 22–27.
The Review. (2004a, September). Lean and trim rewa rice back on road to
profit. The Review, 2.
The Review. (2004b, October). Hari’s deal is best for Rewa: Govt. The
Review, 13.
Trochim, M. K. (2006). The research methods knowledge base. Retrieved
from http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/index.php
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (1996). Annual report. Suva, Fiji: Author.
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (1997). Annual report. Suva, Fiji: Author.
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (2000). Annual report. Suva, Fiji: Author.
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (2001). Annual report. Suva, Fiji: Author.
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (2002). Annual report. Suva, Fiji: Author.
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (2004). Annual report. Suva, Fiji: Author.
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (2008). Prospectus 14 October 2008–13 October
2011. Suva, Fiji: Author.
Unit Trust of Fiji (UTOF). (2011). Prospectus 2011–2014. Suva, Fiji:
Author.
Vagliasindi, M. (2008, April 23). The effectiveness of boards of directors of
state owned enterprises in developing countries. Policy research work-
ing paper 4579. Sustainable development network. The World Bank.
Retrieved from http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.
1596/1813-9450–4579
Yaqub, M. Z., Faisal, F., & Khan, M. A. (2011). Privatisation in emerging
markets: Pakistan’s perspective. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research in
Business, 1(4), 101–106.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 th
e S
ou
th 
Pa
cif
ic]
, [
Gu
rm
ee
t S
ing
h]
 at
 17
:22
 18
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
4 
